SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER

JAN 28 2010

APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF ORANGE

ALAN CARLSON, Clerk of the Count

BY H. POTTER

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

ROMERO,

Defendant and Appellant.

CASE NO. 30-2009-00270350

JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
from the
SUPERIOR COURT
of
ORANGE COUNTY

CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER

HON. DANIEL M. ORNELAS COMMISSIONER

Based upon evidence obtained via an automated photographic enforcement system within the City of Santa Ana, appellant was convicted of failing to stop for a red signal, in violation of Vehicle Code § 21453(a). On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment because the People failed to show the City complied with Vehicle Code § 21455.5(b). Section 21455.5(b) provides, in pertinent part, "Prior to issuing citations under this section, a local jurisdiction utilizing an automated traffic enforcement system shall commence a program to issue only warning notices for 30 days." Appearing as "real party in interest," the City of Santa Ana Police Department contends that the requirements of § 21455.5(b) were satisfied by the issuance of warning notices during a 44-day period in 2003 when the first photographic enforcement equipment was installed within the City's

 jurisdictional limits, and that no additional 30-day warning notice program was necessary when photographic enforcement was installed at the particular intersection at which appellant's violation was recorded.

Vehicle Code § 21455.5(b) states,

Prior to issuing citations under this section, a local jurisdiction utilizing an automated traffic enforcement system shall commence a program to issue only warning notices for 30 days. The local jurisdiction shall also make a public announcement of the automated traffic system at least 30 days prior to the commencement of the enforcement program.

The record indicates that the "local jurisdiction" which utilized the automated traffic enforcement system in this case was the City of Santa Ana, and that the City sought to comply with § 21455.5(b) by making public announcements and issuing warning notices during a 44-day period when the first automated enforcement equipment was activated (at an unspecified location) in 2003. The trial court evidently concluded that the requirements of § 21455.5(b) were satisfied by the actions taken by the City in 2003. Appellant contends that "automated enforcement system" refers not to the entirety of all automated cameras located at intersections throughout the City, but rather to the set of photographic equipment installed at each individual intersection, and that his conviction should be reversed because there is no evidence that warning notices or public announcements were issued pursuant to § 21455.5(b) with regard to the intersection at which the violation occurred in this case. The

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case thus presents a clearly defined issue of statutory construction.

Our task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. [Citation.] We begin by examining the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in the context of the statute as a whole. [Citations.] If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and does not involve an absurdity, the plain meaning governs. [Citations.] If the statute is ambiguous, the court may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the apparent purpose of the statute. [Citation.]

(Leonte v. ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 521, 526-527.)

The trial court's implied construction of Vehicle Code § 21455.5(b) appears to be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word "system" as used in § 21455.5, as well as with the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole. Section 21455.5(a) provides that "... the intersection ... may be equipped with an automated enforcement system," and § 21455.5(a) (1) authorizes a governmental agency utilizing "the system" to "[i]dentif[y] the system by signs that clearly indicate the system's presence and are visible to traffic approaching from all directions" Based upon this intersection-specific usage, "automated enforcement system" in § 21455.5(b) cannot refer to a municipality's overall automated enforcement plan, but must instead refer to each individual set of automated equipment operated at an intersection within the municipal jurisdiction.

Other references to "system" and "equipment" within the

statutory scheme are consistent with this construction. Vehicle Code § 21455.7(a) prescribes change intervals for yellow lights "[a]t an intersection at which there is an automated enforcement system." Section 21455.5(d), permitting specified operational aspects of "the system" to be contracted out if a governmental agency "maintains overall control and supervision of the system," does not necessarily refer to the entire aggregation of automated enforcement equipment operated by a governmental agency, inasmuch as the agency may elect to "contract out" the operation of intersection-specific systems within its jurisdiction to multiple contractors. Similarly, because the statute does not require governmental agencies to grant operational responsibilities exclusively to a single contractor, the prohibition in § 21455.5(d) against contracting out certain operational activities "to the manufacturer or supplier of the automated enforcement system" is not evidence of a legislative intent for each agency to operate a single "system." Contrary to "real party's" assertion, Vehicle Code s 21455.6(a) does not require municipalities to conduct a public hearing every time use of an automated enforcement system is proposed; it requires the governing body to hold such a hearing only "prior to authorizing the city or county to enter into a contract for use of the system" - if a system is installed at a new intersection pursuant to an existing contract, there is no need for a hearing.

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Even if use of the word "system" in Vehicle Code § 21455.5 were ambiguous, the legislative history of § 21455.5 demonstrates that the word refers to the set of equipment installed and operated at an individual intersection and not to a

municipality's entire aggregation of such equipment. Section 21455.5 was originally enacted in 1995 via SB 833, which, according to the Legislative Counsel's Digest, expanded the use of "automated rail crossing enforcement systems" codified the in Vehicle Code § 22451 to encompass "all places where a driver is required to respond to an official traffic control signal showing different colored lights." With this expansion, the system was renamed "automated enforcement system." Mirroring the intersection-specific language of § 21455.5(a), § 22451 provides that a notice to appear may be issued in accordance with Vehicle Code § 40518 "[w]henever a railroad or rail transit crossing is equipped with an automated enforcement system." Vehicle Code § 21362.5(a), enacted in conjunction with § 40518 in 1994, refers to the same "system" in a clearly intersection-specific context: "Railroad and rail transit grade crossings may be equipped with an automated rail crossing enforcement system if the system is identified by signs clearly indicating the system's presence and visible to traffic approaching from each direction." The purpose of the warning requirements was set forth in the legislative findings and declarations of the Rail Traffic Safety Enforcement Act, which added automated rail crossing enforcement systems to § 22451 in 1994: "Automated rail crossing enforcement systems that photographically record violations occurring at rail crossing signals and rail crossing gates are a significant deterrent to these violations where motorists are aware of the presence of the automated systems."

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An amendment to § 21455.5 proposed in 2003 (SB 780) would have required warning notices to be issued "during the first 30

days after the first recording unit is installed." The Legislature's rejection of this language in a year when other amendments to the statute were enacted provides further evidence of a legislative intention for the 30-day warning period to apply instead to each installation of automated enforcement equipment at an intersection. (See City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 88-89; People v. Adams (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 565-566.) Section 21455.5 was instead amended via AB 1022, and the 2003 Legislative Counsel's Digest noted that "[e]xisting law authorizes the limitline, intersection, or other places where a driver is required to stop to be equipped with an automated enforcement system" and that "[e]xisting law requires that, at an intersection at which there is an automated enforcement system in operation the minimum yellow light change interval be established in accordance with the Traffic Manual of the Department of Transportation."

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Although no published decision has directly addressed the issue, published opinions discussing the statute appear to have assumed that "system" refers to the automated enforcement equipment at each intersection: "Former Vehicle Code section 21455.5 (Stats.2001, ch. 496, § 1) authorized the use of automated traffic enforcement systems at intersections where drivers are required to stop." (Leonte v. ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at 526; see also In re Red Light Photo Enforcement Cases (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1327: "Best notes he produced evidence the City of West Hollywood violated Vehicle Code section 21455.5, subdivision (b) by not

¹ Subdivision (b) of the cited 2001 version of § 21455.5 was identical to the current subdivision.

issuing warning notices for the first 30 days after the installation of automated traffic enforcement systems in certain intersections.") The People's own trial exhibit 4, containing 3 information regarding the automated enforcement equipment 4 5 operated by the City of Santa Ana, refers to "each intersection 6 where an Automated Red Light Enforcement System is installed" and 7 to "[t]he intersections where the Automated Red Light Enforcement 8 Systems are operated." This intersection-specific construction is 9 also consistent with the common definition of "system" as a group 10 of regularly interacting or interdependent items forming a 11 unified whole (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 12 1993), p. 1194), a definition which does not comport with "real 13 party's" construction of the word - although the automated 14 enforcement equipment operating at a particular intersection must 15 interact in a manner necessary to produce photographic images of 16 a violation, sets of equipment operating at different 17 intersections within a municipality need not interact with each 18 other in order to function, and a municipality might even elect 19 to operate incompatible types of equipment at different 20 intersections. Nor would it make sense for the scope of the 30-21 day warning period to be limited temporally and defined 22 arbitrarily by the geographic size of the municipality in 23 question, inasmuch as the legislatively stated purpose of the warning requirement is to deter red light violations and that purpose is best achieved by the issuance of new warnings and 26 announcements to proximate users each time automated enforcement 27 equipment commences operation at an intersection.

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Because the People failed to show compliance with the

express requirement of Vehicle Code § 21455.5(b) that municipalities utilizing automated enforcement systems comply with the specified warning requirements "[p]rior to issuing citations," appellant's conviction must be reversed. (See Ralph v. Police Court (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 257, 258-259; People v. Municipal Court (Pellegrino) (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 193, 206.)

The judgment is reversed, with direction that the charge be dismissed.

GREGOR. PRICKETT, Acting Presiding Judge*

GREGORY H. LEWIS,

Judge

March & Robinson

KAREN L. ROBINSON,

Judge

^{*} Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court.