FILED
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE
CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

Plaintiff and

Defendant and

Appellant.

SORIANO,

Respondent,

VS.

CALIFORNIA,

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27 28 APPELLATE DIVISION

ALAN CARLSON, Clark of the Court

DEC 27 2010

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF ORANGE

CASE NO. 30-2010-00385069

JUDGMENT ON APPEAL from the SUPERIOR COURT of

ORANGE COUNTY CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER

HON. CARMEN LUEGE COMMISSIONER

While Officer Bell's expert testimony may have overcome many of the shortcomings addressed in <u>People v. Khaled</u> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, he did not properly authenticate the particular exhibits forming the basis of the charge against appellant in this case. (Evidence Code §§ 702, 1400). Exhibit 2, which purports to authenticate Exhibits 1 and 3, is inadmissible hearsay, as it was not created "at or near the time of . . . the event" as required under Evidence Code § 1271(b) or § 1280(b). Inasmuch as it was prepared, more than three months after the photographs were generated, for the purpose of enabling the prosecution of appellant, Exhibit 2 is also "testimonial" and

thus inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. _____, 129 S.Ct. 2527.)

In the absence of proper authentication either via Officer Bell or Exhibit 2, Exhibits 1 and 3 could be admissible only on the basis of either "self-authentication" or the presumption set forth in Evidence Code § 1553. Self-authentication has been upheld only on the basis of independent corroborating evidence, however, and there is none in this case. (See People v. Beckley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 509, 514-516.) Section 1553 sets forth a presumption that a printed representation of a digitally stored image is an accurate representation of the image it purports to represent, but that presumption is rebutted in this case as to Exhibit 1 by the People's own evidence that the photos in that exhibit "derived Mere from" (i.e., enhanced/altered/modified from) the photos contained in Exhibit 3. (May 25 order at 5:13-15; see Evidence Code § 1402.)

Although the statutory presumption arguably applies to the Exhibit 3 photos, which "are the photos taken by the camera at the intersection with no modifications" (May 25 order at 5:19-22), the photographs comprising Exhibit 3 do not in themselves provide sufficient evidence that appellant violated Vehicle Code \$ 21453(a) - even if it were clear from the photographs and the information printed in the photo, margins that the depicted vehicle passed through a red light without stopping, the only evidence tying appellant to that vehicle is the enhanced image of the driver in Exhibit 1 and the statement in Exhibit 2 (seventh paragraph) that "The defendant information was obtained

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when the license plate of the vehicle was searched . . ."

Because neither Exhibit 1 nor Exhibit 2 was admissible, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.

The judgment is reversed, with direction that the charge be dismissed.

GREGORY H. LEWIS, Presiding Judge

KAREN L. ROBINSON, Judge

JAMES P. MARION, Judge